Violence against civilians is the mainstay of modern warfare, and claims 84 % of the war-related casualties. Looting and terror are the two main reasons why the soldiers victimize the civilians from the other side. However, examples have been found (Congo, Sierra Leone,…) where the guerilla and the incumbent army abuse the civilians from their own side. The present paper offers a potential explanation for this phenomenon, based on strategic looting. It argues that this behavior helps drawing a line between thugs and legitimate rebels. Acknowledgement: This paper is part of the PAC Project CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 funded by the European Commission.
Introduction
Although the idea of regimented war, as codified by Clausewitz, is still widely present in most people's mind, it is largely misleading nowadays. The case of two armies facing each other in a well-defined area, and shooting at each other without involving much collateral damage, is an image of the past. Journalists often describe as "battles" episodes of war where the guerilla or the government's army are simply inflicting a lot of damage to civilians, either by shelling and bombing towns or villages, or while soldiers are simply killing villagers with guns or machetes. Picasso's "Guernica" painting marks a watershed, symbolizing the horror of the layman faced with this new type of warfare, as the Nazis bombed the city with a view to kill a lot of Spanish republican civilians. Civilians have become the main targets of violence in times of warfare. A widely cited figure estimates at 84 % the fraction of civilians in war-related deaths (Cairns, 1997) . Azam (2002) and Azam and Hoeffler (2002) have analyzed this phenomenon of violence against civilians both theoretically and empirically. The former paper explores theoretically the impact of looting, assuming that the civilian casualties are the collateral damage of such activity, and the difference that it makes within a conflict-theoretic framework. The main results are first that violence against civilians by either side are strategic complements: when one side is the victim of some looting, this reduces the opportunity cost of labor, by deterring production, and thus provides an incentive for joining the army, and looting the other side. There is thus a multiplier effect regarding the number of soldiers allocated to looting. Second, in that model, looting is used as a substitute for missing funds, allowing to pay the soldiers, in a world of imperfect capital market. In Azam and Hoeffler (2002) , the opposite effect is created by assuming that raiding civilians is not a collateral damage of looting, but is targeted instead at a military goal, namely to terrorize the peasants, and inducing them to flee the country. The aim is then to clear the ground from its population, in order to reduce the potential support that the guerilla or the army could find in its midst. Then a higher level of funding provides the means for performing more raiding. conduct, and were thus massacred for other reasons. The present paper is an attempt at uncovering one of these potential reasons.
These types of violence against civilians, like the other two types described above, are conspicuously absent from the standard economics literature on conflict. The classic papers by Grossman (1991) and Hirshleifer (1991) are focusing on fighting proper. This is also true of most of the subsequent literature, which has stemmed from these two classics. In most of these models, the conflict technology is the focus of the analysis, which emphasizes the impact on the characteristics of the resulting equilibrium of some key parameters. In the model presented here, a similar type of conflict technology is assumed, but it does not play the same role. Here, the focus is centered on the collateral effects of the looting performed by the soldiers, and the fighting technology is only affecting the outcome through its incentive effects on the warlord's decision.
In Azam (2002) , war is perceived to a large extent as a reciprocal tax tournament, where each side is seeking to grab some loot from the other side, for paying the soldiers' wages, whereas the warlords are assumed to collect taxes from their own folks in an orderly fashion, without any incentive effects. Similarly, Olsson and Congdon Fors (2004) present a theoretical model of a war between two kleptocratic sides, with an application to the war in Congo-Zaïre since 1996. In the model presented below, a closer look is given at the way in which a warlord is managing his manpower for collecting "taxes" on his own side. It turns out that the warlord may have an incentive to go beyond simply collecting the loot, as a tax revenue, and to push strategically instead the level of looting further, in order to affect the labor market's equilibrium wage. The warlord is in fact in the position of a dominant employer, as in Azam's analysis of the Moroccan labor market (Azam, 1992) . Although farming gives rise to a competitive fringe on the labor market, the warlord is in a position to exert some monopsony power. Then, raiding the farmers is liable to reduce the soldiers reservation wage.
Hence, an important difference with Azam (2002) is that here the warlord does not exert full control over his own folks. There is a participation constraint, because unwilling soldiers can always desert in African armies, or simply avoid drafting by hiding in the bush, and go back to their fields, unless a proper incentive structure is provided. A similar constraint is assumed in Azam (2002) , but it only plays a secondary role in that model. Here, it is at the center of the stage, and conditions are presented under which the warlord will use this constraint strategically. Herbst (2000) describes how insurgents sometimes use non economic incentives to impose loyalty on their recruits, thus reducing their reservation wage, in a way that is somehow related to the ones analyzed here. There is no need to go into these refined descriptions for the purpose of the present exercise. Another difference with Azam (2002) is that the analysis performed here uses a partial equilibrium framework, which is sufficient for bringing out the main point.
The crucial assumption involved in reaching this result has an important interpretation, which is bearing on some prominent issues of the dominant conflict literature.
For example, the World Bank has recently published a major synthesis report on the theory and empirics of civil war, which presents some highly influential arguments (World Bank, 2003) . Without going thoroughly into the details of the argument, for the sake of brevity, it is fair to say that this report assumes systematically that insurgents are to blame for the war, and can be regarded for all practical purposes, as criminals. This point of view is reflecting a widely shared perception, which is somehow influenced by the legitimate condemnation of civil war by most observers, as the widespread violence against civilians seems quite naturally morally unacceptable. As Edmund Cairns, an official from the world-wide NGO Oxfam, puts it : "Modern conflict [ ... ] challenges the very distinction between war and peace. It takes place typically not between armies, or even between the army of a state and its armed opposition in some easily-defined guerilla movement. The forces of both government and opposition, from Cambodia to Colombia, blend into illicit business and organized crime" (Cairns, 1997, p.5) . In fact, Collier (2000) has coined the expression "quasi-criminal" activity for describing almost every type of rebellion.
However, in many historical cases, regarding the government as the "good side", and the rebels and the "bad guys", does not seem to provide an accurate picture of the relative legitimacy of the two sides, from the point of view of human rights, or that of the people's right to self-determination. While Mueller (2003) pays lip service to the fact that some rebels are "true believers", he argues that most of them can be regarded as "thugs", and should be treated accordingly. His paper does not offer a clear criterion for picking the good guys among rebels, while the need for such a cutoff line is dramatically felt. How would Che
Guevara have become such a worldwide myth, still treated as a hero in popular songs ("… tu querida presencia, Commandante Che Guevara", says a recent successful song), if all rebellion leaders were just thugs? For example, it is perfectly clear that the backing that Ahmed Masood and the Northern Alliance were getting from the West in their fight against the Talibans in Afghanistan was not a simple tactical alliance. There was a deeply rooted view in the West that this was the "right side", against the forces of darkness epitomized by the Talibans (see e.g. Lévy, 2001) . Masood was largely regarded as a hero.
Another example of an insurgency which cannot be confused with a gang of thugs is the EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front), according to Pool's analysis (Pool, 1998) . The latter shows that this movement had a very clear political agenda, and was going out of its way in order to gain popular support in the liberated areas by engaging in various forms of social spending, in particular in the field of education and health. Comparing this type of behavior to the one consistently applied by the Derg government, on the other side of this conflict (Africa Watch, 1991) , should definitely dispel the idea that insurgents are necessarily the bad guys, and that governments are legitimate all over the world, and deserve the support of the international community. A similar behavior is described by Young (1998) in his description of the TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front). It managed to convince the nobility to perform a land reform, which turned the peasants into active supporters, and improved significantly their fate. In 1978, the TPLF established the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), "a humanitarian organization with a mandate to coordinate relief programs, rehabilitation and development" (Young, 1998) . Therefore, the model presented below does not assume that all insurgents are "thugs", and it aims instead at capturing the significant difference that most analysts want to draw between thugs and legitimate rebels.
This model explores the idea that legitimate rebels would treat their own side better than thugs would, and provides some microeconomic foundations for such a behavior. This viewpoint embeds the hypothesis that "legitimacy", for a rebel movement, refers to the cause being defended, and the means chosen to defend it. The microeconomic foundations presented here allow to derive the latter from the former. The two polar cases are the pure criminal insurgency and the perfectly legitimate rebellion. The latter is done on behalf of a well-defined ethnic, religious, or national group, whose welfare can be improved by waging the war, compared to some status quo. In the former case, the rebel leader is viewed simply as an criminal entrepreneur, aiming at making illegal profit by plundering the country.
Often, natural resources are playing a central role in this case. In the latter one, the rebel leader is described here as a kind of mythical "benevolent dictator", that standard public economics theory has taken from the enlightenment philosophers, as an ideal type (Gray, 1966) . This perfectly legitimate insurgency seeks to maximize the standard utilitarian welfare criterion, while restricting the inclusion of individuals in this objective function to the members of a pre-defined group. Of course, whether the utilitarian welfare criterion is perfectly acceptable from an ethical point of view is a debated issue, which would take us too far afield (see Little, 2002 , for a recent discussion of this point). In fact, the same type of distinction is also relevant for governments, in many developing countries. Many rulers in poor countries can be dubbed "thugs" by this criterion. It is hard to believe, for example, that Charles Taylor, when he was in power, or Mobutu Sese Seko, could legitimately be regarded as "heroes", by any objective standards (see e.g. Olsson and Congdon Fors, 2004, on Mobutu) . This distinction between thugs and heroes of course depends on the viewpoint adopted to look at it. Like the "social bandits" analyzed by Hobsbaum (2000) , the legitimate rebels described here are viewed as "heroes" by one side, and as "thugs" by the other side.
The paper offers an objective criterion for drawing a line between the two types, assuming at the outset that there is potentially a continuum of types between thuggery and legitimacy.
This begs the question of erroneous perception. Thugs can pretend to be heroes, and they usually do so, at least for a while. One can trace the origin of ideology to such a deception strategy, whereby leaders reduce the reservation price of their followers by manipulating their beliefs (see Gray, 1966) . However, the explicit treatment of asymmetric information is left for further research, and full information is assumed below.
The model presented below thus offers some microeconomic foundations for the behavior just described, and shows that the line to be drawn between thugs and heroes does not depend exclusively on the warlord's characteristics, like the parameter capturing the relative weight that he gives to his people's welfare in his objective function. Thus, it cannot be regarded as a purely moral issue, as the use of the value-laden word "thug" could misleadingly suggest. It depends also on the fighting technology. Hence, the latter is coming back at the front stage, but in a different role compared to the one brought out by the classic papers cited above. It interacts with the more ethical characteristics of the warlord's objective function for determining how much violence will fall on the civilians. This paper thus provides some potential foundations for the diagnosis put forward by Mueller (2003) that there are more thugs among rebels nowadays than in the past. This would be the result in the present model of a more decisive fighting technology, providing nowadays an incentive to hire more soldiers, and thus to manipulate the labor market with a view to depress their wages further down.
Section 2 below describes the simple setting of the model, while the subsequent one is devoted to the derivation of the thugs versus heroes taxonomy, drawing a cut off line in the parameter space. Section 4 introduces another potential determinant, namely humanitarian relief. It shows that relief operations, by shielding the soldiers' reservation wage from the effect of raiding on farmers, reduces the warlord's incentive to adopt a thuggish behavior.
Section 5 concludes.
The Model
The main point of this analysis can be derived within a partial equilibrium framework, which models the behavior of one warlord towards his own people, taking as given the other side's behavior. This is sufficient for bringing out the main parameters that determine which warlord is going to behave as a thug, and which one as a hero. The crucial action that is taken as the hallmark of thugs is the perpetration of violence against civilians from their own side.
Assume that there is a large number N of identical individuals from whom the warlord is liable to recruit soldiers, and on behalf of whom he is waging the war. Each of them can work as a farmer, for producing 1 unit of output. As the behavior of the enemy forces is not modeled explicitly here, this output may be interpreted as measured net of the looting performed by the other side's soldiers. However, each farmer is not certain to enjoy the benefit of this production, as he might be raided with probability q by soldiers from his own side, who will grab 1 0 ≤ < δ units of output away. 
This equation (1) lies at the heart of the strategic looting that the warlord can perform, as it entails that a higher probability of raiding each farmer q is liable to depress their reservation wage for joining the army, and thus to reduce the wage cost of the soldiers w.
Whilst this constraint holds, the warlord chooses both F and R (and thus L) subject to the full employment constraint: . It follows that the warlord's people total welfare is given by:
Taking into account the participation constraint (1) yields immediately:
The warlord is waging the war with a view to grab for himself a given prize, whose value is normalized to 1, with a probability
. Moreover, he collects all the loot captured by the raiders, which he redistributes in part as wages to the soldiers.
Therefore, the warlord's profit may be written as:
While a thug will be mainly interested in profiteering from the war, the model allows potentially for a more altruistic behavior on the part of the warlord, with a view to capture the difference between thugs and heroes described in the introduction. Denote 1 0 ≤ ≤ θ the warlord's degree of self-interest. Then, he is assumed to choose w R F and , with a view to maximize:
Hence, this simple framework allows to describe the two extreme cases of the pure thug, who is only interested in his own profit ) 1 ( = θ and the case of the perfect self-less utilitarian leader ) 0 ( = θ . It can also describe all the intermediate cases, where θ can take a continuum of values between these two extremes. As shown below, knowledge of this parameter is not enough to determine who will behave like a thug, and who will be a hero.
The latter label is reserved to the case where the warlord chooses 0 = R , while all the other warlords are regarded as thugs.
Substituting from (3) and (4) into (6), using (2), allows to write the warlord's objective function in the following way:
This expression brings out one the core issues that determines the distinction between the thug and the hero. The first two terms in the sum can be regarded as the revenue side of this profit function, while the third term is clearly the labor cost of maintaining the army. The standard wage cost ( )
which is liable to change completely the interpretation of this wage cost for the thug and for the hero. Taking the two extreme cases brings out this point very clearly. For the perfect thug ( )
the wage cost is entered in the standard fashion, with a coefficient equal to 1. However, for the perfect hero ( )
, the resulting coefficient is -1, so that the wage cost enters in fact the profit function as a revenue term. The intuition for this result is that the perfect hero does not regard the wages paid as a labor cost, but as a transfer in favor of his people. Hence, this enters positively his self-less objective function. In the following, we are not particularly interested in these two extreme cases, and we focus instead on the intermediate cases, where the knowledge of θ is not sufficient for predicting who will behave as a thug, and who will behave as a hero. Nevertheless, the correct intuition can be constructed from these two extreme cases by continuity. Notice that the wage cost of the soldiers disappears from this objective function if 2 / 1 = θ .
Sorting Out Thugs and Heroes
Maximizing (6) under constraints (1) and (2), as well as the definitions (3) and (4), yields the following first-order conditions, for an interior solution with a positive level of raiding:
and:
( )
In a corner solution with no raiding going on, condition (8) will hold as an inequality, because of complementary slackness.
These two conditions bring out the complex relationships that exist in this model between the warlord's degree of self interest and the labor market conditions. The coefficient 1 2 − θ identified above is playing a key role in these two equations. Condition (8) implies that the soldiers may be paid more or less than their marginal expected product from fighting, depending on θ . Similarly, (9) shows that raiders will also get paid more or less than their marginal product at looting.
These conditions can be combined with (1) and (2) for determining the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables. As announced in the introductory section, the thug/hero taxonomy derived from the present model depends both on the warlord's degree of selfinterest, and on the properties of the fighting technology. The key point about the latter can be captured as follows. Define the decisiveness factor as )
. The latter is a convenient way of characterizing the fighting technology, for a given population size. It is related to Hirshleifer's decisiveness parameter (Hirshleifer, 1995) , which is used for measuring the impact of an increase in the relative forces engaged in the fighting by one side on the probability of wining. The steeper the slope of this probability function, the more decisive can an increase in the relative level of the forces engaged be.
Then, what matters is to measure somehow the shift of the ( )
F p'
function, which is higher, the more decisive is the fighting technology. The decisiveness factor defined above ( ) 0 F helps to measure such a shift in the neighborhood of ( ) 1 ' = F p , taken as a benchmark. The decisiveness factor ( ) 0 F defined above is an increasing function of the position of the ( ) Notice that λ is a mongrel parameter, which depends both on the decisiveness factor just defined and on the size of the warlord's group's population. An increase in N thus increases λ , while an increase in the decisiveness factor reduces it.
This allows to establish the main proposition of this paper as follows.
Proposition 1: Given the fighting technology ) (F p and the size of the warlord's group's population N, there exists a degree of the warlord's self interest:
, and the warlord is regarded as a thug.
Remark: Proposition 1 is only of some interest if 2 / λ δ < ; otherwise, all warlords are thugs.
Proof: Substituting from (1) into (8) and (9), and using (2), allows to write the model as the following set of three equations in F, q and λ :
and
Taking the total differentials of (11) and (12), and eliminating F, allows to write:
where:
from (11).
Then, let us look at the borderline case where (11), (12) and (13) hold with q = 0. From (13), one derives easily that (10) must hold in this case, using (11), (12), and the definitions given in proposition 1.
Figure 1: Sorting Out Thugs and Heroes
Figure 1 depicts this relationship, assuming that 2 / 1 > δ . Then, from (14), one finds that q > 0 above the upward sloping curve corresponding to (10), and that q = 0 below this curve. QED Proposition 1, and figure 1 which is derived from it, show that, above 2 / 1 = θ , knowledge of the warlord's degree of self interest is not enough for predicting whether he will behave like a thug or like a hero. Knowledge of λ is needed also. Here, using the decisiveness factor F(0), defined such that p'(F) = 1 as in proposition 1, allows to bring out this role. It is clear that F(0) increases whenever the p'(F) function shifts out, in the relevant neighborhood, i.e. when the fighting forces engaged become more decisive. Then, λ is a decreasing function of this factor. Hence, one would expect an increased incidence of thuggish behavior as time passes, because the technology of conflict evolves over time, θ Heroes Thugs 1/2 λ δ θ 1 making the forces engaged ever more decisive. The result is that insurgents have nowadays an incentive to engage a larger level of forces, and thus have a good reason to try and depress the wage rate further down.
Notice also that λ depends as well positively on the size of the relevant population, as mentioned above. Hence, when comparing two warlords with the same degree of self interest, and having access to the same fighting technology, one would expect the guerilla leader from the smallest group to be more likely to behave like a thug, victimizing his own people, than the leader of a larger group. This seems to fit quite well with the observed behavior of Samuel Doe or Charles Taylor in Liberia, as well as that of Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone (Reno, 1998) . The intuition behind this result is that, faced with a large population, the warlord has an incentive to keep wages high, even if his degree of altruism is quite small, as can be seen by looking at (4) and (6). A fall in the wage rate will then affect much less the utilitarian part of the warlord's objective function if the relevant population is small than when it is large. It is only in the limiting case of the perfect egoist ( ) 0 = θ that this consideration plays no part at all. Equation (11) brings out nicely how raiding and fighting are complements from the thug's point of view. Taking the total differential of this equation yields:
This illustrates the strategic role played by raiding the civilians, which allows the warlord to increase the size of his army, and thus to increase his chances of grabbing the prize at stake.
The simple model analyzed in the foregoing section does not take into account the possibility of an external intervention. However, nowadays in poor countries, the occurrence of civil war generally gives rise to some humanitarian intervention, either by the U.N.
organizations, or by some NGOs. Refugee camps and relief operations are part and parcel with current civil wars. The next section offers an extension of the basic model that includes such a humanitarian intervention. This can be dealt with using only simple modifications of the previous model.
The Impact of Relief Operations
The model of the previous section has shown how the warlord's preferences and the parameters of the conflict technology combine to determine whether he will behave like a thug or like a hero, assuming that no external intervention will be forthcoming. However, ever since the Biaffra war, where "Médecins sans Frontières" (also known as the "French Doctors") started their operations, humanitarian interventions are almost always forthcoming whenever civilians get attacked by soldiers, or get victimized one way or another. The issue arises then whether this response provides more or less incentives to the warlords to victimize their people, because the welfare cost of the latter action is reduced.
Then, one argument could be that relief operations might induce more thuggery, by shielding to some extent the warlord's conscience. Robbing the farmers could then be viewed as an indirect way of taxing the humanitarian actors, at a relatively small cost to the former.
The present section aims at giving an answer to this query.
Assume now that there exists an idealized humanitarian actor, which is liable to provide some comfort to the affected civilians. More precisely, assume that whenever the raiders grab δ from a farmer, humanitarian aid is able to compensate partly the farmer by delivering some aid, given as a fixed amount δ ≤ a
. Then, this model predicts that such a relief system, which is admittedly pretty idealized, reduces the range of parameter values for which a thuggish behavior is adopted. This is the point made at proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2: Given the fighting technology ) (F p and the size of the warlord's group's population N, as well as the amount of aid per farmer a given by the relief operation, there exists a degree of the warlord's self interest:
Any level of relief beyond that point would induce thuggery independently of θ .
Proof: Define a − = δ ε as the effective damage inflicted to the farmer by the raiders, after taking due account of the compensation provided by the relief operation. Then the warlord's problem is to maximize the following expression, where η is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the full employment constraint:
In this expression, the farmer's participation constraint (1) has been substituted out for w, while replacing δ by ε in its equation. Following similar steps to those followed for establishing (11), (12) and (13) in the proof of proposition 1, the first-order condition for this program can be combined with the various constraints to yield:
Comparing (19) and (21), respectively, to (11) and (13), shows the changes introduced by the humanitarian relief. Equation (19) shows that thugs will assign less soldiers to fighting, while (21) yields an ambiguous impact, given q. Equation (20) is just an identity, and is not affected.
Let us now focus on the borderline case where q = 0, while (19) through (21) hold, following the same steps as for proposition 1. This allows to bring out the highest value of the warlord's self-interest parameter that is inconsistent with thuggery, for any given λ .
Then, setting q = 0 in (19) shows that the number of fighters will be the same in this borderline case as in the previous one, were no relief was assumed. In addition, (20) shows that λ is still the relevant share of the population remaining in farming. What is changed is the cut off value of the warlord's degree of self interest, which can be derived from (21) to yield (17).
Then, it is easy to prove that θ θ≥ a . This is illustrated at figure 2. The cut off value of the warlord's degree of self interest that triggers thuggery is easily shown to be an increasing function of a:
Moreover, one proves easily that:
has been defined at (15). Hence, thugs are found again for parameter values located above the a θ line, like at figure 1. QED
Figure 2: Impact of Relief on the Cut Off Line
Proposition 2 thus shows that humanitarian intervention, admittedly modeled here in a pretty idealized fashion, is providing relief by two channels. The first one is that the farmers get some compensation for the damage inflicted by the warlord's raiders. The second one is more indirect, and works through the warlord's incentives. Because of the reduced efficacy of the raids for depressing the market wage rate, the warlord is less inclined a δ λ λ δ22 − − θ a θ to pay soldiers for doing this job. Moreover, because the soldiers' reservation wage remains high, thanks to the limited effect of the raiding on the farmers' net incomes, it is more costly to the warlord to send the raiders to the farms. The result of this combination of higher wage cost and lower efficacy at depressing wages is that the range of values of the warlord's degree of self interest for which he chooses to behave like a thug shrinks. In other words, the borderline between the two types of behavior shifts upwards in the space of figure 1, as a response to the introduction of relief. This response of thuggery to the change in incentives entailed by the introduction of relief highlights the importance of the strategic dimension in inflicting violence on the civilians. The loot collected is the same as in the previous section, but the incentive to raid the civilians is greatly reduced by the provision of relief.
Conclusion
This paper has presented a partial equilibrium model for analyzing the reasons why some warlords inflict some violence on their own civilians. This is an important phenomenon, which has been observed in several civil wars, and seems particularly puzzling to the outside observer. The simple framework analyzed here allows to provide some microeconomic foundations to such a behavior, and thus to identify some factors that are liable to make it emerge as the outcome of a rational choice made by a warlord. The importance of three factors has been highlighted: (i) the warlord's degree of self interest, (ii) the decisiveness factor of the fighting technology, and (iii) the population size of the group on behalf of which the warlord is waging the war. Hence, this model predicts that thugs would emerge in civil wars from small groups, using a highly decisive fighting technology, and would have a high degree of self interest. Hence, the increased presence of thugs in modern civil wars, which Mueller (2003) believes to have identified, could be due to a change in the technology of conflict as much as to some sort of moral decay.
In this model, the warlord does not control perfectly his own folks, and can only attract individuals to join in his army if the incentives are right for doing so. The farmer will only accept to switch to soldiering if his earnings are the same in the two occupations. This participation constraint plays a crucial part in the model, as the warlord can use it strategically. By stepping up the raiding activity of his soldiers against the civilians from his own side, the warlord can not only collect more resources, but is also able to reduce the soldiers' reservation wage. He is thus in a position to reduce his wage cost, and increase his profit. This in turn allows him to hire more soldiers, and thus to improve the odds for his victory. However, the warlord will not necessarily wish to do this, because of the negative impact on the people's welfare that this entails. Unless his degree of self interest is exceedingly high, the warlord might be deterred by this fact. The model is thus focusing on this trade off, and brings out the parameters that affect the warlord's choice.
This framework was easily extended to tackle the issue of the impact of humanitarian relief on the warlord's propensity to behave like a thug. Relief is modeled here as a partial insurance, whereby the farmer gets some compensation whenever he is raided by the soldiers from his side. In this model, this reduces the warlord's incentive to raid the farmers, because it reduces the effectiveness of the participation constraint as a lever for depressing the soldiers' wage cost. This dampens clearly the strategic motive for raiding farmers, with a view to reduce wage costs, and only leaves the pure looting aspect, or revenue raising motive. This impact of introducing relief into the model is thus a nice way to highlight the strategic role played by looting in this model, beside "taxation".
The model rests on some simplifying assumptions, that a deeper analysis should aim at making richer and more realistic. First, it uses a partial equilibrium framework, while a general equilibrium setting might be desirable, in order to bring out the possible interactions between the two contending armies. In particular, looting by one side might reduce the ability of the other side to collect revenues from the same farmers, so that some preemptive raiding might be performed strategically for starving the other side of resources. Second, the farmers might in fact adopt various self-protective measures, like hiding their crop from the raiders, or organizing some self-defense groups, as has been observed recently during the Algerian civil war. Moreover, the risk of being raided might have some impact on the supply side, as farmers might flee to more remote areas, where the soldiers find it harder to catch them, or might switch to different crops, returning for example to low-quality subsistence crops, which are less valuable for looting.
Third, the assumptions made about relief are pretty rough, and provide an idealized picture of the latter as an insurance scheme. In the real world, farmers usually have to join refugee camps for getting some humanitarian support, and thus have to give up farming, or at least to neglect it somewhat. This raises some tricky issues, which have been neglected in the literature. Very often, farmers are in fact moving back and forth between the refugee camp and their own farm, in order to salvage whatever can be salvaged from their crop.
However, this possibility is closed when the camps are located too far away. On the other hand, if the camps are located close enough to the border, they can be used as a base camp by the guerilla. This has been observed during the war in Congo (Olsson and Congdon Fors, 2004) . The international community is now conscious of the ambiguous role of refugee camps during civil wars (Gauer, 2003) . For example, the HCR has interfered with the movement of refugees across the border between Guinea and Liberia or Sierra Leone, and has displaced its refugee camps. The aim of this controversial move was to cut off the Liberian and Sierra Leonian guerillas from the resources provided by the refugee camps, which they were racketeering. However, the displaced camps were then deserted by the refugees, raising doubts about the strategic role of refugee camps in some civil wars. One wonders whether they actually provide an incentive for warlords to terrorize peasants away, with a view to attract humanitarian aid, that can in turn be the racketeered away for feeding the guerilla.
This sample of remaining issues suggests that violence against civilians should attract more attention from conflict scientists. Many puzzles remain, and their solution seems urgent, for mitigating the plight of the civilians victims of civil wars, whose life does not weigh much in most of the third world.
